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indicates that Congress intended to ban state
prosecution and, as has been previously indicated, would seem to have the power to do so.
It must be emphasized that final evaluation of
the statute must await its further application.
Although the forthcoming Supreme Court

decision"4 on its constitutionality will look to
the legal sufficiency, it is hoped that it may
also provide some insight into an evaluation
of the Act.
"' United States v. Ullmann 221 F.2d 760 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 349 U.S. 951 (1955).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
lack of knowledge that a violation has been
filed or a disregard of the condition is no defense. In effect, the ruling of the majority was
tenants were trapped and died because a fire that the mere commission of a misdemeanor,
cut off their only means of egress. The evidence where knowledge is imputable to the defendant,
showed that the defendant knew at the time of renders a person guilty of manslaughter in the
purchase five months earlier that the dwelling first degree where death results. People v.
lacked the required secondary egress and ade- Nelson, 128 N. . 2d 391 (N. Y. 1955).
Two judges of the court filed a lengthy disquate fire protection. However, the evidence
also tended to show that the defendant did not sent. Stated briefly, their position was that
know that violations had been filed against the where a misdemeanor is malum prohibilum there
former owner under the Multiple Dwelling must be a showing of an awareness of the violaLaw and that the existence of these violations tion in order to sustain a conviction of mishad been deliberately concealed from him in the demeanor manslaughter. If an act is merely
real estate transaction. Indicted and convicted prohibited because it is against public policy
of first degree manslaughter under the New then there must be a further wrong-a reckYork Penal Law which provides in part that a less disregard for the safety of others. On the
'person engaged in committing a misdemeanor other hand, the dissent seemed to concede that
affecting .the person or property of th6 person. if the misdemeanor is malum in se then there is
killed' shall be guilty of first degree manslaugh- a sufficient ground upon which to base a conter, the defendant appealed to the Court of viction of manslaughter where homicide results
Appeals of New York. He contended that he from the act. It was the view of the dissent that
had no knowledge or notice of the existing the Multiple Dwelling Law was merely malum
violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law and prohibitum and in order to render a violation
without a showing that he had created or had of its provisions malum in se there would have
knowledge of the violation he could not be to be a showing of actual or imputable knowlfound guilty of first degree manslaughter. edge of the violation-passed upon by a jury.
Therefore, the exclusion of his testimony di- The dissent did acknowledge that an issue of
rected to this proposition constituted reversible fact was presented and that it could be found
error. He argued that he should not have been by a jury that there was sufficient knowledge
deprived of the opportunity to have the jury to establish culpable negligence on the part of
determine whether his violation of the mis- the defendant. However, since the trial judge
demeanor statute was a result of culpable negli- had taken the issue of knowledge away from
the jury and had charged that as a matter of
gence.
A majority of the Court of Appeals of New law lack of knowledge of the misdemeanor and
York was of he opinion that a mere showing of the condition of the building was not a good
a violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law was defense, the dissent was of the opinion that a
sufficient to sustaift the conviction and that a new trial should have been ordered.
Continuing Violation of New York Multiple
Dwelling Law Held Sufficient to Sustain Convlctlon of First Degree Manslaughter-Two
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Amended Illinois Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act-Effective July 1, 1955
Illinois has taken an enlightened step forward
in the treatment of sexually dangerous persons.
The amended Act covers not only the definition
of a sexually dangerous person, but also amends
procedures for the commitment, detention and
supervision of such an individual.
A sexually dangerous person is defined as any
person suffering from a mental disorder for not
less than one year which disorder is "coupled
with criminal propensities to the commission
of sex offenses," and "demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of
sexual molestation of children." Commitment
proceedings are to be initiated by a petition of
the Attorney General or State's Attorney when
it shall appear that any person charged with a
criminal offense is a sexually dangerous person.
This petition, filed with the clerk of the court
in the same proceeding wherein such person
stands charged with a criminal offense, must
set forth facts which tend to show that the person named is sexually dangerous. However, all
proceedings under this Act are civil in nature
and are governed by the amended Illinois Civil
Practice Act.
After the petition has been filed, the court
shall appoint two qualified psychiatrists, defined as those who have specialized in diagnosis
and treatment of mental and nervous disorders
for at least five years, to make a personal examination of the alleged sexual lisychopath. The
psychiatrists shall file with the court a written
report of their conclusions, and, in addition,
deliver a copy to the respondent.
Proceedings under the Act shall be tried to a
jury, if so demanded, and the respondent has
the right to counsel. It shall be competent to
introduce evidence of any crimes comitted by
the respondent together with evidence of any
punishments inflicted thereupon. If the respondent is found to be a sexually dangerous
person, the Director of Public Safety shall be
appointed guardian of that person and the
Director shall keep him committed until recovery and release.
At any time after commitment an application may be filed with the committing court
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showing that such sexually dangerous person
has recovered. If the person has recovered,
as determined by a hearing, his discharge shall
be ordered. However, in those cases where the
Director finds that the person appears to have
recovered but that it is not possible to determine with certainty under conditions of
institutional care that there has been a full
recovery, conditional release may be authorized.
If conditional release is authorized by the committing court upon the Director's petition, the
Director shall continue to supervise the person
under such conditions necessary to protect the
public. If there is any violation of this conditional release, the court is required to recommit
the person under the terms of the original commitment. ILL. Rnv. STAT. c.38, §§ 820-825e
(Smith-Hurd 1955).
Interrelationship of "Indeterminate Sentence," "Good Behavior" and Parole Statutes
in Determining Proper Time for DischargeNew Mexico has three statutes which bear on
the question of the proper method of fixing a
date for the final discharge of a prisoner. The
"indeterminate sentence" statute requires the
trial judge to impose a sentence within the maximum and minimum limits prescribed for the
crime of which a person is convicted; but sentence may be suspended in the case of a first
offender. Under this statute the release of the
person "shail be as provided by law." A second
statute provides for the computation of time
for uniform good behavior which will entitle the
prisoner to a reduction of the length of his
sentence; this statute is supplemented by an
allowance for additional reduction of the terms
of "trustees." The third group of provisions
relating to the problem of discharge are those
which deal with parole, which vest the power
in the prison board to release a prisoner on
parole after he has served the minimum time on
his sentence. Under a uniform practice which
had been indulged in by trial judges, the general
assumption had arisen that "good time" was
to be subtracted from the minimum sentence in
determining the appropriate date of discharge.
Within the above framework the petitioner
here, who was serving a three to four year sen-
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tence, sought a mandamus to the parole board
ordering his release. His argument was that he
was entitled as a matter of right to a final discharge when his minimum sentence, minus
"good time," had been served. Petitioner placed
strong reliance upon the alleged custom which
had arisen and been applied in New Mexico for
approximately forty years. The Attorney
General could not, the court observed, successfully rebut this argument, and so he relied
instead upon a construction of the wording
of the three statutes in issue.
The court examined decisions of other states
which have analogous statutes and concluded
first that the three sets of statutes "can exist
along together." Examining the language of the
statutes in New Mexico it found that the dear
meaning was that "good time" was to be deducted from the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. It also held that no prisoner
is entitled to parole at any time as a matter of
right and that the discretion vested in the
parole board cannot be controlled by mandamus. However, in view of the fact that the practice had arisen in the state to deduct "good
time" from minimum sentences, the court was
impelled to recommend that the record of all
prisoners, incarcerated prior to 1955, be reexamined by the parole board "with a view of
recommending executive clemency by way of a
pardon or conditional pardon where warranted, so as to achieve as nearly as possible
the former policy of deducting good time off
the minimum sentence." The petitioner was
then remanded to the custody of the Superintendent of the penitentiary and the alternative writ of mandamus which had issued against
the state parole board in the lower court was
discharged. Owens v. Swope, 287 P.2d 605
(N.M. 1955).
Privilege against Self-Incrimination under
Fifth Amendment Held Applicable in Proceeding before State Grand Jury-The defendant was called as a witness by a state grand
jury investigating a charge of public bribery.
After he had refused to answer several questions propounded to him, the grand jury granted
him immunity under an applicable provision

of the state constitution. At the time of these
proceedings the defendant was charged in the
federal district court with a failure to collect,
account for and pay wagering excise taxes to
the United States. Upon his continued refusal
to testify after the proffered grant of state immunity from prosecution, the defendant was
cited for contempt, found guilty, fined and imprisoned. After his release he was again called
before the state grand jury and the entire process was repeated. The matter came before the
Supreme Court of Louisiana upon an application for writs of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition to review the ruling below adjudging the defendant guilty of contempt a second
time.
The majority of the court first held that a
person may be twice sentenced for contempt in
separate criminal proceedings arising out of the
same circumstances and that the defendant
could not claim his privilege against selfincrimination under the state constitution
since there had been an effective offer of immunity. Addressing itself to the problem of
whether the defendant could invoke the Fifth
Amendment on the ground that the pending
indictment in the federal court conclusively established that he would be subjected to the
dangers of prosecution if required to testify,
the court concluded after a review of several
cases: "... [A] person may refuse to divulge
information or to testify under the constitutional privilege granted him by the Fifth
Amendment on the ground that his disclosures

would subject him to the danger of prosecution in a Federal court, or be used in the proof
of charges pending before the Federal jurisdiction. ...

Where it appears that the danger is

remote or unlikely, the privilege against selfincrimination should not be extended. Nevertheless, where the danger is imminent, such as
in cases which involve then pending charges

awaiting prosecution, the privilege of immunity
[sic] should be extended to a witness." State
v. Dominguez, 82 S.2d 12 (La. 1955).

Three separate dissenting opinions all agreed
that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not
extend to criminal proceedings in state courts.
Noting that the defendant's privilege under the
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state constitution had been effectively removed
by the grant of immunity, one of the opinions
attacked the cases upon which the majority
opinion had relied. The gist of this analysis was
that in each instance the defendant who was
permitted to invoke a privilege against selfincrimination in state criminal proceeding on
the ground of imminent danger of prosecution
in another jurisdiction, was permitted to do so
under the state privilege against self-incrimination and not the federal. See People v. DenUyl,
318 Nich. 645, 29 N.W. 2d 284 (1947); State
ex rd. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 S. 2d 887 (Fla.
1954).
In Abortion Prosecution Corroborating
Evidence Must Tend to Connect Defendant
with the Crime without Reference to Abortee's
Testimony-The abortee in this case testified
convincingly as to the identity and guilt of the
defendants. However, corroborating evidence
was almost entirely circumstantial and the
defendants did not take the stand. In charging
the jury, the trial judge stated the test of legal
corroboration as"being "whether the evidence
other than the [testimony of the aborteel by
reasonable inference, connects the defendant
with the crime or whether it satisfies the jury
that the woman is telling the truth." [emphasis
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by the court] At another point the trial judge
told the jury that "corroborating evidence may
take interpretation and direction from the
testimony" of the abortee in order to give
it meaning and value. The applicable California statute states that a person cannot be
convicted of abortion unless the testimony of
the abortee is corroborated by other evidence.
CAL. PEN. CODE. §1108 (1954). These instructions, in addition to the improper admission of
certain testimony given at a preliminary hearing by an absent witness, were held by the
Supreme Court of California to be reversible
error and to justify a new trial. People v. MacEwing, 288 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1955). The court
stated that the rule regarding sufficiency of corroborating evidence is as follows: "The corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to
connect the defendant with the commission of
the crime in such a way as may reasonably
satisfy the jury that the witness who must be
corroborated is telling the truth." As to the
assertion that corroborating evidence may be
considered in the light of the abortee's testimony in order to take on meaning and value the
court held that corroboration is inadequate
where it requires aid from the testimony of the
person to be corroborated. Such evidence must
be considered without reference to the testimony which it must support.

